This paper discusses some measures of information which naturally arise in the context of statistical games (games against nature). Some useful inequalities are proven relating the entropy to the value of information provided by experiments. Two other measures, based on the notion of a metric as informational distance and that of a diameter value are also discussed.
Motivation
A general approach toward measuring information has been developed within statistical decision theory. Note that this development is unrelated to Fisher's theory of statistical estimation where the proposed measure of information (regarding statistical observations) turns out to be a particular case of Shannon's measure. In modern statistical decision theory we are concerned with information provided by an experiment.
An experiment X is completely described by a random variable associated to some sample space giving rise to a set of conditional probability distributions for every possible value of a parameter (state of nature). Note that X might itself be of fixed sample size or of a sequental type where the experimenter may collect observations finitely many times. To set up the problem assume you (the experimenter or the statistician) are confronted with an uncertain situation where you wish to know about the true value of a state ~o e f2. Of course you can make some guesses but the only way to gain knowledge about the true value of the state (e.g., to rationalize these guesses) is by performing experiments.
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or ignorance on your part. (Adopt a Bayesian viewpoint that such # always exists and is non-null.) Then the information provided by X may be more loosely described as the difference between the amount of uncertainty you attach to the prior distribution and the amount of your expected uncertainty of the posterior distribution (after having performed X), i.e., it reflects the residual value of your uncertainty (reduced).
There is an obvious connection of this situation with the structure of a statistical game in which two players are referred to as "nature" and "the statistician". Here, in order to constitute the statistician's strategy, the possibility of "spying" by performing an experiment plays an important role. Note that in statistical games o) (in some finite set f2) constitute nature's pure strategies, whereas, nature's mixed strategies can be identified with your prior distribution over f2 associated to some sample space. More technically, let ~' be the set of prior probability distributions tt over f2 (i.e., the space of randomized strategies for nature), define u as a nonnegative, real-valued measurable function on ~' which for obvious reasons should be concave, i.e., decreasing with increasing observations. Then u(#) represents the amount of your uncertainty (before experimentation) when your distribution over f2 is #. Now by performing X and observing values of X you may specify a posterior distribution #(X), then your measure of information 1 is determined by
where #(X) is usually obtained by an appropriate application of Bayes' theorem.
This approach has been consistently pursued by de Groot (1962) , and somewhat earlier, by Blackwell and Girshick (1954) . It is usually assumed for reasons of non-trivialty that most experiments provide information and that any experiment being more informative than another is also preferable to the other. Therefore, for any given uncertainty function, I is nonnegative, and also for reasons of convenience continuous.
This measure of information provided by an experiment relative to the specification of u and # naturally evolves from a model of statistical decision. Usually the determination of the uncertainty function hinges upon the loss structure of a statistical game. Every experiment X associated to a sample space generates a risk function, defined as the expected value of assigning to every decision act its numerical loss for any given state of nature. From this we learn that information evolving from a statistical decision problem generally takes into account economic considerations of benefits and costs (via the loss function). From an economic point of view, information may be regarded as a particular kind of commodity traded at a certain price yielding benefits for consumers and causing costs for producers. The economic theory of information hence is an appropriate modification of the approach used in statistical decision theory 1. To put it in other terms, we would be interested in the economic aspect of usefulness of information (based on some kind of utility or loss function) rather than in the (original) physical viewpoint of transmitting and controlling information flows through a large (noisy or noiseless) communication channel. This viewpoint has been consistently advanced by Marschak (1970) on the basis of earlier results due to Blackwell (1954).
Marschak's "value of information" attached to some experiment w.r.t, any probability distribution # over f2 (his space of events non-controllable to the decision maker) and his benefit function b:f2 x A---,Re (A being the set of decision acts) is just the converse value of Blackwell's risk r(X). Note that the risk function is completely specified by a probability distribution over f2 and a loss function on f2 x A. One can readily see the strong agreement between information provided by an experiment and the value of information by considering an experiment as a Markov matrix, as done by Blackwell. In this case null-information corresponds to identical rows in the Markov matrix, i.e., any observation made through an experiment is independent of any state of nature. Accordingly, the risk function obtained by the less informative experiment is larger in value than the risk function obtained by the more informative experiment. It is obvious that the dual statement holds if we deal with a benefit function instead of a loss function.
In this paper we suggest various measures of information which quite naturally arise in the context of statistical games (also known as games against nature). Although these measures are strictly confined to a situation constituted by these types of games, the remarks above indicate they might be also of interest for an economic theory of information, at least from a methodological point of view.
The Concept of Information in a Statistical Game
We consider a game in which the statistician is able to select a decision strategy on the basis of information available to him. The question how "useful" (in terms of payoff expected) information will be for this statistician is put into the structure of his decision problem; any information received which is unrelated to his problem is of no worth to him.
For the moment, let us consider a game (CL I;'4~) between nature and the statistician with payoff function qS. Let f2 and Y be compact metric spaces so that 4) satisfies some mild continuity condition, e.g., a Lipschitzian condition in f2 x Y We consider those subsets of metric spaces which naturally form a class of Borel sets, called the Borel a-field satisfying some closure postulates, hence in defining a probability distribution (p.d.) on a compact metric space it is obvious that this distribution is defined on Borel sets of this space. Since every random variable X associated to a sample space (Z, f2) induces a probability distribution /~ on Z x C2, it will be more convenient for our purposes to refer to/~ as an experiment whose outcomes z ~ Z for any co ~ f2 are governed by the conditional destribution Po~ with values p(co[ z) -= #~(z). Irl order to reveal the structure of information in this game we frill assume that the person must take a decision 7 ~ Y prior to the experiment /~, and by adopting a Bayesian view,/~ should be known to him in choosing a Bayesian strategy which takes into account prior information in a systematic fashion. This means that a decision y ~ Y is taken that minimizes the average of the payoff value, E{~(co, y)} = S ~(~o, y)d~(z).
Before we proceed, some notational clarifications are in order. We define # as the prior p.d. on [2 and X is a random variable with values in Z. Then if z = X(co) is the value of X in Z,/G(z) -= g(co [z) is the conditional distribution of ~o given z. Correspondingly, gL(z') _~/~'((~]z'), generated by X' taking values in Z', z' = X'(co), is the conditional distribution ofo given z'. Now, let us consider the possibility that the statistician can obtain additional information on his decision problem by performing an auxiliary experiment. relative to z and z'. It is in the spirit of the Bayesian approach to assume that a person can perform an auxiliary experiment/~' prior to taking a decision. In this case the average payoff value will be z~ ' { min ~ r y)dlt~,(z, z')}dff(z').
We may call the difference
the value of information in experiment # generated by experiment p'. This value does not change if we add or subtract some positive amount. By adopting a Bayesian strategy, the statistician would attempt to choose a decision which minimizes his expected loss in terms of the payoff value, i.e., Then the relationships between (1) and (4) and between (2) and (3), respectively, are determined by the following simple set of inequalities (i) log,(1/1 -w) <h,
(At least, I believe, properties (i) and (ii) are well supported by similar properties in standard information theory.)
Outline of Proof. 1. We first verify inequality (i).
Let z' be a particular outcome in Z' and let Mr,, . The following notation is convenient:
Then we have
By straight-forward application of Jenson's inequality we get 
An Informational Metric
It seems natural in view of the approach adopted here to use the metric in a compact metric space for constructing some notion of informational distance in a subjective sense. From the Bayesian point of view we may assume that a person-before performing an experiment-knows about a particular presentation of nature's pure strategy, given by a point co ~ ~2. Now, after having performed the experiment, this person observes the actual state to be ~o o E f2. Let 6 :f~ x O ~Re be the ordinary metric such that 6 associates a real number 6(o), COo) with every pair (co, e)o) of elements of O. Then 6(co, COo) represents a change of the informational state of a person (change of belief) in terms of a distance, satisfying well-known conditions of a numerical metric. Given a set of random variables X1 .... X., sequentially designed, the search problem of a person would consist in observing a sequence of points co a .... co. approaching the true state co o ~ O. Now in the context of a statistical game (O, Y, qS) there is an interesting way to reformulate an informational metric in terms of an economic value of information. Let us assume a person by observing co takes a decision y out of his decision set G+@(co) = {y: ~b(co, y) = ~p(a))} with lp(O))----rain t~(co, y).
Hence, the value of information of a person selecting a decision y on the basis of observation oJ compared to a true state ~Oo can be given as a number m(~Oo, ~o) = max q~(~Oo, y) -mingoo, y). In what follows we are dropping 09 in/2,o throughout. Let J//denote the space of all probability distributions /2 over O, characterizing randomized strategies for nature. Then the payoff value in the game (~', 1(2) is given by 2(/2, y)= S r y)d/2. Accordingly, we may introduce in ~' a metric 6 in ~' which associates with every pair (/2~,/22) a number 6(/2./22). In order to obtain a value of information in this case we may assume accordingly that the a priori probability distribution known to the player is not the true distribution/20 but some distribution close to it. Suppose he knows the posterior distribution q(z]/2, z'), if the prior distribution is/2 and the outcome for the experiment v is z'. Assume that the player starts with some distribution /2 which is close to the true distribution /2o. Then by taking a decision a priori the player minimizes Taking into account that the true distribution is/2 0 we may compute the value of information in the game (~g, I;'2) by v = v(/2, v)
Y~ ~(/2), Yz, ~ ~(,7~o,z,).
Since the decisions y, Yz, need not be uniquely determined, the quantity V(/2, v) may also not be unique. Let ~ be some other experiment which does not generate true distribution/2o, and let 
]
The metric in ~ is given by
By imposing a rather mild continuity condition on r i.e., by requiring that r satisfies a Lipschitzian condition in the first variable with a constant k, we have the relation 6(/20,/2) < ka(/20,/2).
An Alternative Measure of Information
Consider the game (s yr To obtain information about the true state 09o may result in the specification of a set H ( 12 to which O9o belongs. Hence, we introduce the class H = {~} of closed subsets of 12. In this case the game is defined by the triple (ova, 1(r and the payoff value will result from the player's decision on the basis of his representation ~. Here it might be useful to introduce the concept of diameter value of a set 9r which characterizes the player's losses resulting from his ignorance about the true state 09 0 ~ f2. The diameter value D(Jf ~) is specified with respect to the strategy of a player with representation H. The true representation is the singleton {090}. If the player takes a decision that minimizes a certain payoffvalue r y) the diameter value is given by This construction relates to the strategy of a player who, by knowing that O9o ~ ~, selects any point o9 E at random basing his decision on the assumption that this point is true. Also Do(~t ~) increases with Jt ~. Now in case that D(~) increases with ~ (where we can only take a restricted class of available decision criteria indicated above), this value can be interpreted as an analogue of the entropy value. This interpretation makes sense in view of the following situation.
Suppose that a player before taking a decision with a representation Jg performs an auxiliary experiment v yielding a representation ~' where Ar is considered to be a closed subset of f2 having a non-empty intersection with r When receiving a message "(no ~ Jg" the player forms a representation ~' with diameter value D(~')< D(o~g). The difference
D(~) -D(Jf c~ ~')
is nonnegative and is a suitable analogue of the information value of an experiment # generated by an experiment v.
Notes Added in Proof
Note that the existence of the metric is presupposed. Since we consider the metric as some measure of informational distance in a subjective serme, it would be interesting to pursue properties of the underlying qualitative structure. Various structures of this sort have recently been examined by Luce (still unpublished notes) in terms of proximity structures and extensive measurement.
By choosing a metric as a measure of informational distance in a statistical game one can fully exploit the generality of metric spaces. If necessary, one can generalize the metric to a probabilistic metric constituting uncertainty about the true distance [see Ref. 4] . Some use of a metric measuring information distance has been made by J. A. Goguen [5] for discrimination information.
